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Abstract. We present a practical selective forgery attack against RSA
signatures with ﬁxed-pattern padding shorter than two thirds of the mod-
ulus length. Our result extends the practical existential forgery of such
RSA signatures that was presented at Crypto 2001. For an n-bit modu-
lus the heuristic asymptotic runtime of our forgery is comparable to the
time required to factor a modulus of only 964n bits. Thus, the security
provided by short ﬁxed-pattern padding is negligible compared to the
security it is supposed to provide.
1 Introduction
Let N be an RSA modulus, and let n denote its bit length. At Crypto 2001 two
attacks were presented against RSA signatures with a ﬁxed-pattern padding
shorter than 2n/3: a practical existential forgery attack that runs in time poly-
nomial in n and a selective forgery attack with unspeciﬁed non-polynomial run-
time [2], see also [5,6,10] for several previously known results. The attack of [2]
can, however, not be guaranteed to work for all selected messages. In this paper
we extend the selective forgery attack by presenting a modiﬁcation that works
for all selected messages. It can be shown to have heuristic asymptotic expected
runtime
e(1+o(1))(logN)
1/3(log logN)2/3
for N →∞, where log denotes the natural logarithm. Our modiﬁed attack works
well in practice. This is illustrated by a successful selective forgery attack against
a 1024-bit RSA modulus.
Despite a series of increasingly eﬀective attacks, ﬁxed padding RSA signa-
tures remain adopted by several standards. For more details and additional ref-
erences see [2]. Although the attacks do not extend to random padding, they
can be dangerous if the padding is obtained by applying a ‘weak’ hash-function
to the message.
Let d and e satisfy ed ≡ 1 mod ϕ(N), where ϕ(N) is the Euler function. The
value of d is private while N and e are public. We assume that the residue ring
of integers modulo N is represented by the elements ZN = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}.
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A ﬁxed-pattern padding scheme works by concatenating each 	-bit message
with the same (n − 	)-bit padding. The resulting padded message, which is an
element of ZN , is then signed by computing its d-th power modulo N . It has
been shown in [2] that for 	 > n/3 the attacker can generate in deterministic
polynomial time four interrelated 	-bit messages so that valid signatures on three
of them can be used to generate a valid signature on the remaining one. This is
an existential chosen message attack because there is no control over the message
for which the signature is forged. It was shown in [2] that the attack succeeds
for 1024-bit RSA moduli.
It has also been described in [2] how the attack can be modiﬁed into a selec-
tive forgery attack, i.e., an attack where the message whose signature is forged
is selected in advance. However, this modiﬁcation has not been analyzed in de-
tail. For example, neither the general strategy nor the precise runtime have been
described, although it is mentioned that it no longer runs in polynomial time.
Actually, the selective forgery from [2] works only occasionally. For most selected
messages it will not be successful. In this paper we present some considerations
which help to facilitate a selective forgery attack. As a result our selective forgery
attack may be expected to work for all selected messages. Our analysis includes
an optimal choice of parameters and a heuristic estimate of the asymptotic run-
time. The runtime is subexponential, but it is much lower than a brute force
factorization attack via the number ﬁeld sieve. Furthermore, we present an ex-
ample of a successful selective forgery attack against an unfactored 1024-bit RSA
modulus.
In Section 2 we review the attacks from [2] and present some additional
observations concerning them. In Section 3 we present our alternative approach
to the selective forgery attack and analyze its runtime. In Section 4 an example
of a successful selective forgery attack is presented. For ease of reference the
notation from [2] is maintained as much as possible.
2 Idea of the Attack
For an 	-bit message m the ﬁxed-pattern padding is denoted by R(m) ∈ ZN .
The signature s(m) is deﬁned as
s(m) = R(m)d mod N. (1)
Following [2], we deﬁne
R(m) = ω ·m+ a (2)
where ω and a are the ﬁxed multiplicative and additive redundancies, respec-
tively. Given a ﬁxed (n− 	)-bit padding Π, left-padding Π|m is obtained using
ω = 1, a = 2Π and right-padding m|Π using ω = 2n−, a = Π. Note that in
the former case Π and in the latter case m should be small enough to make sure
that R(m) ∈ ZN .
Let m1, . . . ,m4 be four distinct 	-bit messages such that
R(m1) ·R(m2) ≡ R(m3) ·R(m4) mod N. (3)
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With (1) it follows that
s(m3) =
s(m1) · s(m2)
s(m4)
mod N
unless the inversion modulo N of s(m4) fails. The latter possibility is ignored
from now on, since it would lead to a factor of N . In any case, if equation (3)
is satisﬁed, then the signature s(m3) of m3 can be computed given signatures
s(m1), s(m2), and s(m4) of m1,m2, and m4, respectively.
With P = a/ω mod N and (2) congruence (3) is equivalent to
P (m3 +m4 −m1 −m2) ≡ m1m2 −m3m4 mod N.
With
t = m3, x = m1 −m3, y = m2 −m3, z = m3 +m4 −m1 −m2 (4)
this becomes
Pz ≡ xy − tz mod N. (5)
For an existential forgery attack, integers t, x, y, z satisfying (5) are constructed
so that the corresponding m1, . . . ,m4 are at most 	 bits long. We describe the
construction from [2] in slightly more detail than can be found in [2]. Let PiQi
denote the i-th continued fraction convergent to P/N . Then
∣∣∣∣
P
N
− Pi
Qi
∣∣∣∣ ≤
1
QiQi+1
.
There is an integer j such that Qj < N1/3 ≤ Qj+1. Let u = |PQj −NPj |. Then
0 < u ≤ N/Qj+1 < N2/3 and Pz ≡ u mod N
for an integer z with |z| < N1/3, namely either z = Qj or z = −Qj .
Given z, an integer y is selected with N1/3 ≤ y ≤ 2N1/3 and gcd(y, z) = 1.
It follows that t can be found such that 0 ≤ t < y and
tz ≡ −u mod y.
With
x = (u+ tz)/y ≤ u/y + z ≤ 2N1/3
and Pz ≡ u mod N , the integers t, x, y, z ≤ 2N1/3 satisfy congruence (5), as
desired. From |z| < N1/3 and y ≥ N1/3 it follows that y + z > 0, so that
x+ t = (u+ t(y + z))/y > 0 since u > 0. Therefore, the messages
m1 = x+ t, m2 = y + t, m3 = t, m4 = x+ y + z + t
(cf. (4)) are positive and about 	 bits long, assuming that 	 ≈ n/3. Clearly, this
attack runs in polynomial time.
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For a selective forgery attack, congruence (5) is rewritten as
(P +m3)z ≡ xy mod N. (6)
Given m3, integers x, y, z satisfying (6) are sought such that the corresponding
m1,m2,m4 are no more than 	 bits long. In [2] it is suggested to compute the
continued fraction expansion of (P +m3)/N , resulting in z, u with |z| < N1/3
and 0 < u < N2/3 such that
(P +m3)z ≡ u mod N (7)
and to write u as the product xy of two integers x and y of about the same size.
Since z and u are almost certainly unique (over a random choice of the message
m3 and the value P that follows from the padding) this attack fails if u cannot be
factored in the prescribed way. Indeed, it follows from [7, Theorem 21] that with
overwhelming probability a randomly selected integer u does not have a divisor
in the range [u1/2−η(u), u1/2+η(u)] for any function η(u)→ 0. It is also useful to
recall that for any ﬁxed 0 < δ ≤ 1/2 the density of the integers u having a prime
divisor exceeding u1−δ is positive. More precisely the density is − log(1 − δ),
see [3]. Thus, for almost all messages m3 the resulting u simply does not split
into two factors of about the same size. This point is not mentioned in [2], and
neither is it explained how one should go about factoring u. In Section 3 we
address both these problems.
3 Improvements
As usual LM (α, γ) denotes any quantity of the form
exp((γ + o(1))(lnM)α(ln lnM)1−α)
for M → ∞. Then factoring u in congruence (7) using the number ﬁeld sieve
takes about
LN2/3
(
1/3, (64/9)1/3
)
= LN
(
1/3, (128/27)1/3
)
see [9]. However, as noted in Section 2, the selective forgery attack fails if u
cannot be factored as xy, with x and y of about the same order of magnitude.
We show that by allowing a little bit of ‘slackness’ and by working with
marginally longer messages of size O(N1/3+ε), one can eﬃciently produce a
sequence of u-values based on a single message m3. Moreover, this allows us to
use the elliptic curve factoring method [11] to quickly search for a u with a large
smooth part. Overall we obtain a considerable speedup of the approach that uses
the number ﬁeld sieve.
Fix a small positive ε and let M =
⌊
N1/3
⌋
. For a random integer k with
0 < k < Nε apply the continued fraction algorithm to (P +m3−kM)/N to ﬁnd
vk, wk such that
0 ≤ vk ≤ N1/3, 0 ≤ |wk| ≤ N2/3,
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and
(P +m3 − kM)vk ≡ wk mod N.
It follows that
(P +m3)vk ≡ wk + kMvk mod N.
Multiplying both sides by −1 if necessary, we obtain the congruence
(P +m3)zk ≡ uk mod N
with 0 ≤ |zk| ≤ N1/3 and 0 ≤ uk ≤ 2N2/3+ε.
Analyzing the continued fraction algorithm we see that unless most of the
fractions (P+m3−kM)/N admit abnormally good approximations, diﬀerent val-
ues of k are likely to produce diﬀerent pairs (vk, wk), and thus diﬀerent (zk, uk).
We remark that a fraction A/N has abnormally good approximations if and only
if it has a very large partial quotient in its continued fraction expansion. On the
other hand, one easily derives from [12, Theorem 5.10, Theorem 5.17, and (5.11)]
that ‘on average’ over all A ∈ ZN with gcd(A,N) = 1, the largest quotient of
A/N is O(log2N). This shows how the value u in (7) can be randomized, thereby
solving one problem with the selective forgery attack proposed in [2]. It remains
to analyze how many values uk have to be generated before a ‘good’ one can be
recognized quickly.
A positive integer is Y -smooth if all its prime factors are at most Y . Let
Ψ(X,Y ) denote the total number of Y -smooth numbers up to X. The following
estimate is a substantially relaxed and simpliﬁed version of (for example) [8,
Corollary 1.3]: for a ﬁxed arbitrary δ > 0, X ≥ 10, and α ≤ (logX)1−δ,
Ψ(X,X1/α) = Xα−α+o(α) (8)
for α→∞.
From the sequence of uk values we are interested in those uk that have a
factor exceeding 0.5
√
uk that is N1/α-smooth with
α = c(logN)1/3(log logN)−1/3, (9)
for a constant c.
We remark that this choice of α optimizes (up to the value of the constant
c which we choose later) the trade-oﬀ between the number of trials before a
‘good’ uk is found and the complexity of ﬁnding an N1/α-smooth factor of such
numbers using the elliptic curve factoring method [11].
Thus logα = (1/3 + o(1)) log logN for N → ∞. According to (8) one may
expect that there are
Ψ(N1/3, N1/α) = Ψ(N1/3, (N1/3)3/α) = N1/3(α/3)−α/3+o(α)
integers s ∈ [(N/2)1/3, N1/3] that are N1/α-smooth. Also, the number of primes
p ∈ [N1/3+ε, 2N1/3+ε] is proportional to N1/3+ε/ logN . Thus, for such s and p,
the number of products sp is
N2/3+εα−α/3+o(α)(logN)−1.
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With (9) this becomes
N2/3+εLN (1/3,−c/9).
It follows that we may expect that one among LN (1/3, c/9) numbers uk has an
N1/α-smooth part that exceeds 0.5
√
uk. Note that LN (1/3, c/9) < Nε for any
ﬁxed ε > 0 and N → ∞. Using the elliptic curve factoring method [11] the
N1/α-smooth part of uk can be found in heuristic expected time
LN1/α
(
1/2,
√
2
)
= LN
(
1/3, 2
√
1/3c
)
.
Therefore the total complexity of ﬁnding a ‘good’ uk is
LN (1/3, c/9)LN
(
1/3, 2
√
1/3c
)
= LN
(
1/3, c/9 + 2
√
1/3c
)
.
This is minimized for c = 3 giving LN (1/3, 1) for the total heuristic expected
runtime. Note that LN (1/3, 1) is substantially faster than
LN (1/3, (128/27)1/3) ≈ LN (1/3, 1.68),
the runtime of the approach that attempts to use the number ﬁeld sieve to factor
u directly. The latter approach is not always successful because u may not split
into two factors of about equal size.
Because
LN (1/3, 1) = LN9/64
(
1/3, (64/9)1/3
)
(10)
one may be tempted to expect that our selective forgery attack against 1024-
bit moduli is easier than factoring 150-bit moduli using the number ﬁeld sieve.
However, (10) is an asymptotic result, useful for understanding the asymptotic
growth rate of the runtime of our method, not to obtain absolute runtimes. To
illustrate this, implementations of the number ﬁeld sieve factoring algorithm
use very fast sieving-based smoothness tests. Using the elliptic curve factor-
ing method as smoothness test instead leads to the same heuristic asymptotic
runtime for the number ﬁeld sieve, but doing so would make it much slower
in practice. Our selective forgery attack is in theory based on the elliptic curve
method, but uses in practice a combination of trial division and the elliptic curve
method – much faster sieving based smoothness tests do not seem to apply.
Nevertheless, and as shown in Section 4, our method is very practical. On
average it turns out that a selective forgery attack against 1024-bit moduli can be
expected to be easier than factoring moduli of about 250 bits using the number
ﬁeld sieve. Factoring 250-bit moduli is currently considered to be a triviality.
Consequently, obtaining a 1024-bit selective forgery is a simple matter too. This
practical result was obtained using a moderately eﬃcient implementation of the
elliptic curve method. With more careful coding it should not be hard to improve
upon the practical performance of our method.
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4 Example
We present a selective forgery attack against N = RSA-1024, the as yet unfac-
tored 1024-bit challenge modulus from RSA Laboratories:
N = RSA-1024
= C05748BB FB5ACD7E 5A77DC03 D9EC7D8B B957C1B9 5D9B2060
90D83FD1 B67433CE 83EAD737 6CCFD612 C72901F4 CE0A2E07
E322D438 EA4F3464 7555D62D 04140E10 84E999BB 4CD5F947
A7667400 9E231854 9FD102C5 F7596EDC 332A0DDE E3A35518
6B9A046F 0F96A279 C1448A91 51549DC6 63DA8A6E 89CF8F51
1BAED645 0DA2C1CB,
see http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/challenges/factoring/numbers.html.
With ω = 1 and a = 21023 + 2365 and
m3 = 167148 0115C7FF 50D924CC 6DD0B4EE AA7C04FD E74073D7
8D010BB2 8DB1B371 C8D2A0E1 EE09EA3E D721BCCE
(the hexadecimal representation of the ﬁrst 103 digits of π) a search of a few
hours on a 600 MHz PIII laptop using a commercially available implementation
of the elliptic curve factoring method produced:
R(m1) = 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00002000 12CDBE43 3BF454BD CE9C1D5C
6BEB3D7C DC937495 8CAB854E 56EE8476 F1FF524D 3C5E8E25
5D60E809 04C3DDB8,
R(m2) = 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00002000 075BC9B1 A93BA55B DC35329E
B66E4BC1 915568BA EEEDC419 E3114231 626E8C21 9DF736BE
12312CF1 C92314A0,
R(m3) = 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00002000 00167148 0115C7FF 50D924CC
6DD0B4EE AA7C04FD E74073D7 8D010BB2 8DB1B371 C8D2A0E1
EE09EA3E D721BCCE,
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R(m4) = 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00002000 1AA5C13B 5A416F97 8EC675C4
A924CE38 3A44C314 C4DF7204 E5D5197F D2E1363B 98D81A66
5AF68931 6B749CB9.
Because R(m1), . . . , R(m4) satisfy (3), the signature s(m3) on the preselected
message m3 can be forged, as desired, if s(m1), s(m2), and s(m4) are known.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have extended the existential forgery attack against short ﬁxed-
pattern padding RSA signatures from [2] to a practical selective forgery attack.
Here ‘short’ means that the ﬁxed-pattern padding is shorter than two thirds of
the modulus length. The heuristic asymptotic runtime of our method was shown
to be LN (1/3, 1). It thus provides an example where a runtime of LN (1/3, 1)
is achieved using the elliptic curve factoring method. As noted in [1, Section
4.2], where an earlier example is given, this is rare, as such runtimes are usually
associated with Coppersmith’s discrete logarithm algorithm for ﬁnite ﬁelds of
ﬁxed small characteristic [4] and the number ﬁeld sieve [9].
It remains an open question if short ﬁxed-pattern padding RSA signatures
can be selectively forged in polynomial time. Neither is it known if attacks ex-
ist against longer ﬁxed-pattern padding RSA signatures. It is quite natural to
try to build multiplicative relations including more than four signatures (which
could be a way to attack longer paddings), however at the moment it is not clear
how to approach this. Until these issues are settled, research into the practi-
cal malleability of ﬁxed-pattern padding RSA signatures remains an interesting
subject because it may shed new light on the properties of RSA, still the world’s
foremost public key system.
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